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Legal Ethics
by Roy M. Sobelson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The biggest news in Georgia legal ethics this year actually made it
into the general press' when the Georgia Supreme Court approved a bar
committee opinion confirming that real estate closings remained the
exclusive province of licensed Georgia lawyers.2 With the Justice
Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and consumer advocates all
weighing in with contrary opinions,3 the court held firm against the
inevitable, continuing criticism and cries of protectionism.4 Combined
with the current debates over both multidisciplinary5 and multijurisdictional practices,6 it looks like the profession will continue to engage in

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Emory University (B.A.,
1972); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1976); Temple University School of Law
(L.L.M., 1982). Former or current: Special Assistant General Counsel, State Bar of
Georgia; Reporter, Chief Justice's Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement;
Member, Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism; Formal Advisory Opinion Board;
State Bar of Georgia Committee on Professionalism; Special Master. Georgia Supreme
Court.
1. David McNaughton, Closings to Require a Lawyer: Notaries Lose Fight in Court,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 11, 2003, at Dl.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., David McNaughton, Bar Battles to Keep Real Estate Role: Court to Rule
if Lawyer Needed at the Closing Table, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 21, 2003, at Dl.
4. See, e.g., Anna Marie Stolley, Lawyers Told to Back Off on Plan: ConsumerHarm is
Cited, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 2002, at 3D; Adam Liptak, U.S. Opposes Proposalto Limit
on Who May Give Legal Advice, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2003, at All; A Conspiracy Against
Consumers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 6, 2003 at 44A.
5. See STATE BAR OF GA., REPORT ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, available at
http'//www.gabar.org/pdfMDP-report.pdf.
6. See Amendments to Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of
the State Bar of Georgia, available at http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/amende_rules/6_8_2004_order.htm.
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heated debate in Georgia, if not worldwide, 7 well into the foreseeable
future. Meanwhile, the Georgia Supreme Court made several changes
to our Rules of Professional Conduct8 along those lines, but all of them
occurred just outside the operative dates of this survey, June 1, 2003 to
May 31, 2004. 9
As for news of interest almost exclusively for practicing attorneys, a
local litigator created quite a stir when he repeatedly violated a court's
motion in limine order and received no trial court sanction for his
violations. 10 Of more interest here, perhaps, is the surprising news
that his conduct apparently contravenes no Georgia ethics rule.
Whether the courts themselves can prevent such behavior or make it
cost ineffective remains to be seen.

II. ADVISORY OPINIONS
Opinions Issued by the Supreme Court
Although several formal advisory opinions were issued this year, the
supreme court entered the fray only once and approved a Formal
Advisory Opinion Board opinion." The supreme court agreed with the
Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law 2 ("Committee")
that the preparation and execution of a deed of conveyance by someone
other than a licensed Georgia attorney' 3 constitutes the unlicensed
practice of law.'4 The opinion should be no surprise, given the court's
traditional insistence that the protection of the public is best served by

A.

7. See, e.g., Katherine L. Harrison, MultidisciplinaryPractices: Changing the Global
View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 879 (2000).
8.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA HANDBOOK H-22 (2003-

2004).
9. See, e.g., Amendments to Rules and Regulations for the Organization and
Government of the State Bar of Georgia, available at http'//www2.state.ga.us/Courts/
Supreme/amended_rules\6_8_2004_order.htm.
10. Rachel Tobin Ramos, Lawyer's Tactics Cost Him Verdict of $150,000, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 16, 2003.
11. Formal Advisory Opinion Board opinions, which are approved or modified by the
supreme court, are "binding on all members of the State Bar and shall be published in the
official Georgia Court and Bar Rules manual [and] [the Supreme Court shall accord such
... opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial
opinions of the Court." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-403(e), supra note 8, at H-64.
12. In re UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E.2d 741 (2003).
13. While the court is not explicit about the precise practices being questioned, the
Standing Committee's opinion "focuses on 'notary closers,' 'signing agents,' and others who
are not a party to the real estate closing, but nonetheless inject themselves into the closing
process and conduct... a 'witness only closing.'" Id. at 472, 588 S.E.2d at 741.
14.

Id.
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prohibiting lay conveyancing"5 or witness-only closings. 16 In previous
opinions 17 the court made it clear that lawyers may not delegate
responsibility for real estate closings to non-lawyers," and licensed
Georgia lawyers must be physically present for the closings to be
0
proper. 9 While the court did not explicitly mention this idea, the

Committee concluded that "the execution of a deed of conveyance is so
intimately interwoven with the other elements of the closing process so
It is one of the 'entire series
as to be inseparable from the closing ....
of events through which the title to land is conveyed .... ,,21 Thus, it
looks like Georgia lawyers will continue their traditional control over all
the critical elements of the real estate closing business.
The court looked to two sources as the basis for its opinion. First, the
Georgia General Assembly established statutory policy that only
attorneys are authorized to close real estate transactions.22 Second,
because the court ultimately controls the practice of law, it must render
its own judgment about how the judiciary can best serve the interests of
the public. On that count, the court insisted that lawyers are both
uniquely qualified for closings and may be held accountable for any
professional performance failures under malpractice law and the
attorney disciplinary system.23 Three things are interesting about the
court's judgment on this issue, quite apart from the statutory definition
of the practice of law.

15. The court defines lay conveyancing as "the practice by which non-lawyers close real
estate transactions, provide settlement services, or select, prepare and complete certain
real estate closing documents." Id. at 474 n.2, 588 S.E.2d at 742 n.2.
16. The court says that "[witness-only closings 'occur when notaries, signing agents
and other individuals who are not a party to the real estate closing preside' over the
execution of the deeds of conveyance and other closing documents, but purport to do so
merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing law." Id. at 474 n.3, 588
S.E.2d at 742 n.3.
17. See Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 86-5 (86-R9) (1989); Formal Advisory Op.
Bd., Formal Op. 00-3 (2000).
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-02, 277 Ga. at 474,588 S.E.2d at 741. One of the
peculiar things about the advisory opinion process is that if the court grants review, it
writes a whole new opinion, leaving the reader with both the opinion of the Board and the
opinion of the court. In this case the Board's opinion is longer and more explicit than that
of the court.
21. Ga. State Bar Standing Comm. on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, Advisory Op.
2003-2 (2003).
22. See O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 (2003) (defining the "practice of law" as including
conveyancing and the preparation of legal instruments whereby a legal right is secured).
23. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. at 474, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
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First, the court acknowledged that lay-closing advocates complain that
24
this rule increases prices, even while it decreases consumer choices.
The court, however, made no attempt at all to address either of these
complaints. 5 Second, the court offered no evidence, apocryphal or
empiric, that lawyers are more competent than non-lawyers at performing these functions.2" Not all lawyers are veteran practitioners in this
area, and Georgia has no system for registering specialists in given legal
areas whereby only they are allowed to practice in that field. Yet, the
court's position is basically that any lawyer, with any experience base,
is better suited for these tasks than any non-lawyer.27 Given the wide
variety of education, training, experiences, and practices in which
lawyers engage, this simply cannot be true. In fact, the court noted that
several states allow non-lawyer closings, and it offered not a single word
to suggest why these states are incorrect or are suffering from the
practice.28
Third, although lawyers may be liable for malpractice or subject to
discipline, Georgia lawyers are not required to hold malpractice
insurance. For injured consumers, these remedies offer little consolation.
While the disciplinary process is applicable only to lawyers,29 one would
be hard pressed to find many instances where lawyers are publicly
reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred for deficient performance of real
estate closings. Even if a lawyer is disciplined, it is entirely possible
that it will be confidential, leaving the public at the mercy of incompetent and dishonest lawyers.
Advocates of limiting closings to lawyers argue that although
disciplinary action is not common, it is still possible. In fact it is more
possible in Georgia than in other jurisdictions. Rule 1.1 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 3° requires a lawyer to provide a client
with competent representation, which includes the "legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.""' The comments acknowledge that competent representation can be provided "through the association of a lawyer of
established competence in the field."3 2 The Georgia version of this rule

24. Id. at 473, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 473-74, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
28. Id. at 474 n.2, 588 S.E.2d at 742 n.2. The court noted that Virginia, Colorado, and
Minnesota are among the jurisdictions allowing lay conveyancing. See id.
29. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. at 473-74, 588 S.E.2d at 742.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
31. Id.
32. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
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places the ABA's nonbinding"3 commentary within the enforceable rule
itself, stating: "A lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer
knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence
without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably
believes to be competent to handle the matter in question."14 By
adopting a unique combination of the American Bar Association ("ABA")
model rule and Georgia's old directory rule on competence, 5 the
Georgia rule requires, rather than suggests, that inexperienced lawyers
get help in handling cases out of their comfort zone."6
In the end one should not lose sight of two facts about lawyers who
perform real estate closings incompetently. First, the violation of a
disciplinary rule does not in itself give rise to a cause of action for
damages.3 " Second, even a successful disciplinary prosecution provides
the injured consumer no damages, no reparations, and no real remedy.3" In fact, prosecution may not even provide protection for future
victims of the lawyer's malpractice because most discipline is private and
unavailable to consumers who seek information from the Bar.39 Adding
insult to injury, the Clients' Security Fund's charge is limited to cases
involving dishonest conduct and does not cover negligence. 0
The controversy regarding nonlawyers who conduct closings is unlikely
to die down any time soon. The Bar has already issued notice of another
proposed opinion, which concerns the propriety of a lawyer's use of a
nonlawyer entity to conduct closings and place the proceeds in a nonIOLTA account. 4' Once again, the Board opines that if lawyers are
present at closings, the proceeds must go into their IOLTA accounts.
However, if lawyers are not present, a non-lawyer's participation
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.42 The only remaining
question is whether the supreme court will find it necessary to grant

33. "The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule
is authoritative." Id. at Preamble, Scope and Terminology cmt. 21.
34. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, supra note 8, at H-24.
35. "A lawyer shall not ... handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to
handle it. .. ."Directory Rule 6-101(A)(1), STATE BAR OF GEORGIA HANDBOOK 33-H (19992000).
36. Id.
37. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1A, supra note 8, at H-24.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. PartX: Clients'Security Fund, GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 10-106(a), supra
note 8, at H-129.
41. See First Publication of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion 02-Ri, GA. BAR J. 89-90
(June 2004).
42. Id.
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review of yet another opinion saying the same thing-real estate closings

in Georgia are reserved for those with a Georgia license to practice law.
Opinions Issued by the FormalAdvisory Opinion Board
The Formal Advisory Opinion Board ("Board")issued three opinions in
this survey period, none of which was approved by the supreme court.'
In Formal Advisory Opinion 03-1," the Board addressed whether a
Georgia attorney may contract for a non-refundable retainer. This is a
critical question, not only because in criminal defense practice such fees
are common,' but also because the supreme court has given confusing4
advice about retainers in the past. In Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2, 1
when asked whether a lawyer had to put a "retainer that represents
payment of fees yet to be earned" in a trust account, the court 47 first
declared that "one can reasonably take the position that 'retainers' and
'flat fees' may be placed in the general operating account .... "48 This
would suggest the fee was fully earned upon receipt and belonged only
to the lawyer,49 because any fees still belonging to the client, at least
in part, should first be deposited in the lawyer's trust account. 50 Yet,
the same opinion went on to say that because the lawyer is a fiduciary,
he must still "return to the client any unearned portion of a fee."51
However, if the fee is fully earned upon receipt there would be nothing
to refund, even if the client fired the lawyer immediately after paying
him.52
B.

43. These opinions, not granted review or adoption by the supreme court, "shall be
binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and
not on the Supreme Court, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only." GA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-403(d), supra note 8, at H-64.
44. Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-R7 (2003).
45. See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE
AND THE PROFESSION 85-90 (2d ed. 2000).
46. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 91-2 (1992), supra note 8, at H-95.
47. At the time Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2 was issued, all such opinions were
approved and ultimately issued by the supreme court. See id.
48. Id.
49. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II)(a) states that "[aill funds held by a lawyer for
a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited
and administered from" the lawyer's trust account. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.15(II)(a), supra note 8, at H-35. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II)(b) states that "[n]o
personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned
attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned." Id. R. 1.15(H)(b), supra note

8, at H-35.
50. Id.

51. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 92-1 (1992), supra note 8, at H-96.
52. Id.
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This opinion comes one step closer to approving non-refundable
retainers by acknowledging two points. 53 First, the Board notes that
"[some services, for example, the ... commitment to the client's case
and acceptance of potential disqualification from other representations, 4 are provided as soon as the contract is signed. The portion of
the fee reasonably allocated to these services are, therefore, earned
immediately."55 Second, the opinion notes that a lawyer may "designat[e] by contract points in representation at which specific advance fees
payments under a special retainer will have been earned ... .5 6
However, the opinion left open the question of whether a fee contract
is ever reasonable, and fully enforceable, if it designates the entirety of
the retainer as earned immediately upon payment, and the client fires
the lawyer before allowing the lawyer to do any substantial work on the
case. This is not merely an academic question. Suppose, for example,
a criminal defense lawyer is approached by one of a number of codefendants in a serious criminal matter. If the co-defendants' interests
do not warrant hiring one lawyer for all of them," the lawyer has a
critical choice to make. If the lawyer takes on only the one client, an
immediate substantial investment could be required to hire the
appropriate investigators, experts, support personnel, co-counsel, and the
like. Such an investment is all the more likely if the case is ripe for
trial, a more common occurrence for the criminal defense lawyer than
any other practitioner. The lawyer will need to commit early and receive
the retainer to make any other necessary commitments. Once the
lawyer has committed to the client, taking on the defense of any other
co-defendants will be impossible. Further, if the lawyer were hired and
fired by the original client, it is highly unlikely the lawyer could later
agree to represent one of the other co-defendants. The lawyer should not
have to give up a substantial part of the fee simply because he lacks the
requisite hours to justify it. The fee is justified by taking on and gearing
up for one case at the expense of all others. One could argue the Board's
opinion brings us one step closer to a definitive answer, but we are not
quite there.
In Formal Advisory Opinion 03-2,"s the Board was asked whether
confidentiality of information applied between two jointly represented

53. Id.
54. This would be especially appropriate if the lawyer were hired by only one of a
number of co-defendants who appeared to have inconsistent needs and defenses, or both.
55. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 03-1 (2003), supra note 8, at H-114.
56. Id.
57. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 8, at H-28.
58. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 03-2 (2003).
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clients.5" The opinion is thorough, frank, and on point. First, the
Board correctly noted that confidentiality under the Rules is different
from the attorney-client privilege," and the normal waiver rules
encountered in dealing with the privilege do not apply.6' The Board
noted that, conceivably, two persons requesting joint representation
might not agree to share all information with one another.6 2 In that
situation, the real problem is not honoring confidentiality; the problem
is the inherent conflict that exists in representing two persons who
profess to have common interests, yet refuse to be completely candid
with one another. The likelihood that a lawyer could continue to
represent such clients is very slim. Each client, whether represented
alone or in tandem, is owed a duty of confidentiality." If a lawyer's
representation of a co-client jeopardizes that duty, the common
representation will suffer, not the confidentiality obligations. 6
In Formal Advisory Opinion 03-3," the Board addressed the propriety of attorneys receiving percentage finders fees for sending their
clients to financial investment advisers.66 While the Board did not
completely foreclose the possibility of entering into these arrangements,
it came very close to doing so by charitably declaring them "ethically and
legally perilous."67 Emphasizing that the lawyer must always exercise
independent professional judgment on the client's behalf,68 the Board
made it clear that this arrangement would affect the lawyer's own
financial interests, as well as the client's.69 In particular the lawyer
would always have to decide whether referral to an adviser was best,

59. Id.
60. Id. "The duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege ....
First, the attorney-client privilege pertains only to the admissibility of particular evidence
in a judicial proceeding .... By contrast, the duty of confidentiality applies beyond that
setting ... [and] instructs a lawyer not to use or divulge protected information in any
setting. Second... privilege protects communications, not information." PAUL T. HAYDEN,
ETHICAL LAWYERING:

LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE PRACTICE OF

LAW 157 (2003).
61. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 03-2.
62. Id.
63. "A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional
relationship with a client...." GA. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), supra note 8, at
H-27.
64. Id.
65. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 03-3 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.1, supra note 8, at H-38.
69. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 03-3 (2004).
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and then, whether the specific adviser best served the client's interests.7 °
The Board's decision is correct, but banning the practice altogether
would also have been completely justifiable. As with any conflict of
interest issue, the problem is not the reality of an improper influence
upon one's judgment but the potential for it. Any referral to another
professional could benefit both the adviser and the lawyer, leading to
more referrals and even kickbacks of one kind or another. The lawyer's
potential for referral could even be influenced by the possibility that a
relationship with an adviser might reduce the funds the client has
available to pay to the lawyer. Once a referral is imminent, the decision
of which adviser to choose could easily be determined by who pays the
highest referral fees. Percentage referral fees to the lawyer could create
bidding wars for the highest payor rather than the most competent
financial adviser. This is similar to concerns over the propriety of
referral fees amongst lawyers themselves, which are largely curbed by
the requirement that fees only be shared with non-firm lawyers in
relation to the work they perform or by a written agreement to assume
joint responsibility for the matter.7 '
III.

LAWYER DISCIPLINE

This year produced the usual array of disbarments, suspensions, and

the like, 2 but two cases are of particular interest. In re W. Oellerich,
Jr.7 3 is a classic case of a conflict between the lawyer's personal
interests and those of his client. In 199471 Oellerich engineered a deal
in which his executor client loaned $120,000 to a corporation of which
Oellerich's wife was president. The corporation defaulted, and the loan
was eventually discharged in bankruptcy. 75 In this disciplinary action,

70. Id.
71. GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDuCT R. 1.5(c), supra note 8, at H-26.
72. In the period from May 1, 2003, to April 30, 2004, the Georgia Supreme Court took
the following public disciplinary actions: 34 disbarment/voluntary surrender cases, 22
lawyers; 42 suspension cases, 29 lawyers; 4 public reprimand cases, 4 lawyers; 1 Review
Panel Reprimand case, 1 lawyer. James B. Wellington, Chair, Review Panel, Annual
Report of the Review Panel, STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD FOR OPERATIONAL YEAR 2003-2004.
73. 278 Ga. 22, 596 S.E.2d 156 (2004).
74. The statute of limitations for bar disciplinary cases is normally four years, with a
tolling provision for the bar member's disappearance and the like. GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-222(a), supra note 8, at H-62. The court held that Oellerich waived his
statute of limitations defense by his failure to raise the issue in his answer or his response
to the State Bar's motion for summary judgment. In re Oellerich, 278 Ga. at 24, 596 S.E.2d
at 158.
75. In re Oellerich, 278 Ga. at 23, 596 S.E.2d at 157.
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Oellerich was disbarred7 6 for violating the now defunct Standard 30,"
which provided that "if the exercise of his professional judgment on
behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property or personal interests,"7" the lawyer has to
make full disclosure to the client and get the client's consent.7 9 The
rule is based on the oft-stated principle that business transactions
between clients and their lawyers are presumed to be the product of
overreaching 0 and fraud."1 Thus, the rule requires the lawyer to
insure that the2 client is fully apprised of all the risks inherent in such
a transaction.
Oellerich claimed that the deal was done with his client's consent, and
he offered her signature on the loan check as evidence.8 3 0 ellerich's
claim was plausible given that Standard 30 only required the lawyer to
obtain "the written consent or written notice ... after ... disclosure
.... "' The Standard did not explain what had to be disclosed, nor did

it require that the disclosure itself be in writing. 5 All the Standard

76. While Oellerich cooperated in this first disciplinary action against him, he
ultimately failed to admit to the wrongfulness of his conduct, which may have been an even
bigger mistake than entering the transactions with his client in the first place.
77. As of January 1, 2001, the Rules of Professional Conduct are effective, displacing
the previous Code of Professional Responsibility and Standards of Conduct. See Office of
General Counsel at http'J/www.gabar.org/ogcrules.asp.
78. PartIV: Discipline, STANDARD 30, supra note 35, 43-H.
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt. e (2000).
81. See Reeder v. Lund, 236 N.W. 40, 44 (1931) (citing Comm. on Profl Ethics &
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895 (1982)).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 (2000).
83. In re Oellerich, 278 Ga. at 23, 596 S.E.2d at 157-58.
84. Until January 1, 2001, the relevant rules and standards were contained in the
aspirational Canons of Ethics and the accompanying mandatory Standards of Conduct. See
PartIII: Canons ofEthics, supra note 35, at 24-H; PartIV, Discipline,supra note 35, at 40H. Standard 30 provided:
Except with the written consent or written notice to his client after full disclosure
a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property or personal interests. A violation of this standard
may be punished by disbarment.
Standard30, supra note 35, at 43-H. Standard 30 is substantially similar to the current
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 with three exceptions. First, Standard 30 allowed a

lawyer to handle a conflict between the client's interest and his own interest with "written
consent or written notice" to his client, while Rule 1.7 requires actual consent. Second, Rule
1.7 requires that the lawyer inform the client of the risks in writing. And third, Rule 1.7
requires the lawyer to give the client "the opportunity to consult with counsel."
85. PartIV: Discipline,Standard30, supra note 35, at 43-H.
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actually required was notice to the client, not the client's actual
consent.8 6
Invoking "the letter and spirit of Standard 30," the supreme court read
it as requiring more than was apparent from reading the Standard itself,
saying:
[T]he written notice or written consent must be clear enough to
evidence to an objective third party that the client has consented to the
legal representationdespite the disclosure of a conflict of interest. Such
The
informed consent cannot be shown by a mere signature ....
existence of the potential conflict must itself be expressed in writing
87

The court's holding is not only a very generous reading of Standard 30,
it may also be more than is required by the current Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct, which displaced Standard 30. First, the now
applicable Rule 1.7(b) 8 suggests the client's consent should "preferably
[be] in writing" but does not require a writing.8 9 Second, the rule does
require a writing about the risks involved, but that writing need only
provide "reasonable and adequate information about the material risks
of the representation. . . ."9 Third, the current rule does not actually
require that the consent be clear enough to convince an objective third
party of its genuineness, but perhaps that is accomplished by Rule
1.7(b)(3)'s requirement that the lawyer give the client "the opportunity
to consult with independent counsel."9 1 Even interpreting the rule this
way, Georgia does not go as far as most states, which require that "the
client [be] advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given
a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel
In the end, what the court seems to be
on the transaction . . . .'
imposing is an informed consent9 3 requirement, much like what the
ABA has incorporated in its new and improved version of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.94 However, putting aside the require-

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
In re Oellerich, 278 Ga. at 24, 596 S.E.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b), supra note 8, at H-28.
1d
Id.

91. Id.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(2), supra note 30, at 139 (emphasis
added).

93. "'Informed consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e), supra note 30, at 13.

94. Id.
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ments of the rule, one has to wonder about the advisability of entering
into any business transaction with a client without first obtaining a
clearly written description of the risks involved; a signed consent form;
and a written statement, in bold writing, encouraging the client to seek
the objective advice of another lawyer before signing on the dotted line.
In re Maples9 5 is an ordinary case in terms of its facts, but some
critics may regard it as a regrettable statement about the level of
seriousness with which grievances are sometimes taken against Georgia
lawyers. Maples was charged with abandoning his client on a motion for
a new criminal trial9" and a subsequent failure to respond to the
Neither of these charges were unique in
charges against him.9"
Maples's career. As the court noted, Maples already had five prior
disciplinary actions under his belt, including two public reprimands and
two letters of admonition, at least two of which were for virtually the
The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
same misbehavior.98
("Rules") provide that a "third or subsequent disciplinary infraction...
shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or
disbarment"99 and that both admonitions and reprimands are included
within the rule. 10 0 What is surprising is the court's imposition of a
twenty-four month conditional suspension instead of disbarment.1"'
Justices Thompson and Hunstein dissented, stating the appropriate
punishment should have been disbarment.'" The decision may have
been based on extraneous factors not mentioned in the opinion, but at
face value, the decision gives heart to serial offenders of our disciplinary
rules.
WV
A.

JUDGES-REMOVAL AND RECUSAL

Removal

During the survey period, one Georgia magistrate judge was removed
from office. In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Charles T Robertson I''

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
(2004).

277 Ga. 453, 588 S.E.2d 742 (2003).
See Standard of Conduct 44, supra note 35, at 44-H.
In re Maples, 277 Ga. at 455, 588 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-103, supra note 8, at H-54.
Id. R. 4-206, supra note 8, at H-54.
In re Maples, 277 Ga. at 456, 588 S.E.2d at 744.
Id., 588 S.E.2d at 742 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Charles Robertson II, 277 Ga. 831, 596 S.E.2d 2
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concerned Charles T. Robertson, 11,104 Chief Magistrate of Cherokee
County. Judge Robertson's eligibility to hold office was challenged on
the ground that he was a convicted felon, having received two courtmartial convictions and a bad conduct discharge from the United States
Army."' Thus, he was alleged to be statutorily unqualified to serve,
as well as in violation of Canons One'0 8 and Two'07 of the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct.'0 °
The supreme court concluded, without difficulty, that although the
general court-martial convictions were not classified by the military as
felonies, they were the equivalent of such, and thus, Judge Robertson
"falsely swore that he had not been convicted of a felony involving moral
turpitude.. ." when he qualified to run for office.'0° In deciding what
sanction to impose upon Judge Robertson, the court"0 made a rather
curious statement. The court first stated that the test for the appearance of impropriety is "whether the situation would create in reasonable
minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired,""' which accurately captures the point of the "appearance of
impropriety" test as it applies to judicial officers." 2 The court then
held that Judge Robertson's presence on the bench was eroded, in part,
by his "taking the position that his military crimes were not in the
nature of crimes ...

[of] moral turpitude .

. . .""'

Taken at its literal

word, the court held that the public's confidence in Judge Robertson's
service as a judge was eroded by his advocating that he was not in fact
a convicted felon."' Again, taking this holding literally, the court

104. Born Charles T. Sexton, the judge changed his name to Charles T. Robertson, II
after his bad conduct discharge from the U.S. Army. Id. at 832, 596 S.E.2d at 4.
105. Robertson was convicted of wrongfully selling a missile tracker and remote control
test, and a year later was convicted for possession of drugs. Id. at 832 n.2, 596 S.E.2d at
4 n.2.
106. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, supra note 8, at H-137.
107. Id. Canon 2, at H-137.
108. Id. at H-137 to 138.
109. In re Robertson, 277 Ga. at 833, 596 S.E.2d at 5.
110. While all members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC") agreed that
Judge Robertson had falsely sworn that he had never been convicted of a felony and that
his conduct violated Canons One and Two of the Code of Judicial Conduct, two members
of the JQC did not think he should be removed from the bench. Id. at 833 n.3, 596 S.E.2d
at 5.
111. Id. at 834, 596 S.E.2d at 5.
112. See GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Commentary to Canon 2, supra note 8, at

H-137.
113. In re Robertson, 277 Ga. at 834, 596 S.E.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
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would suggest that had the public known of Judge Robertson's courtmartial convictions, and no proceeding had ever been brought against
him in which he raised this defense, there may have been no problem at
all. Surely, the court did not mean this literally. Of course, the court
added to Robertson's list of misdeeds his failure to "disclose his actions
or make an expression of contrition for them prior to being elected
.... "115 The final question the opinion raises is: If an admitted
convicted felon expressed contrition for his acts, would that eliminate
any appearance of impropriety in his holding an elected judicial position?
Maybe so.
B.

Recusal

The Alapaha Judicial Circuit... produced two recusal cases, which
skeptics may point to as unfortunate illustrations of small-town Georgia
justice. Smith v. Guest Pond Club, Inc."' involved an alleged trespass
in cutting down trees, and Georgia Transmission Corp. v. Dixon" s
involved a real property condemnation case. In each case the Georgia
tourt of Appeals" 9 reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to
recuse, largely based upon the Georgia Judicial Code of Conduct's
prohibition of both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 2 °
A little background is necessary to understand the two cases. The four
county Alapaha Judicial Circuit has a Chief Judge, Brooks Blitch, and
one other judge, Dane Perkins. Berrien Sutton and George Bessonnette,
the only juvenile court judges in the circuit, also serve in that circuit as
superior court judges by designation. The two are also empowered to
designate each other as a superior court judge in any given matter.
Judge Perkins was one of the parties in Georgia Transmission,'2' and
In both cases, Judge
Judge Bessonnette presided over Smith.
Sutton served as counsel for the appellees."' Thus, each case involved
some combination of the circuit's judges as parties, counsel for parties,
or presiding judges.

115.

Id.

116. This southeastern circuit comprises Atkinson, Berrien, Cook, and Lanier counties.
117. 277 Ga. 143, 586 S.E.2d 623 (2003).
118. 267 Ga. App. 575, 600 S.E.2d 381 (2004).
119. Smith was decided by the supreme court, and GeorgiaTransmission was decided
by the court of appeals. See Smith, 277 Ga. at 143, 586 S.E.2d at 623 (2003); Ga.
Transmission, 267 Ga. App. at 575, 600 S.E.2d at 381.
120. See GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Commentary to Canon 2, supra note 8, at
H-137.
121. Ga. Transmission, 267 Ga. App. at 575, 600 S.E.2d at 382.
122. Smith, 277 Ga. at 145, 586 S.E.2d at 625.
123. Id.; Ga. Transmission, 267 Ga. App. at 578, 600 S.E.2d at 382.
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In Smith, the first of the two cases, the Guest Pond Club ("Guest
Pond") sued Smith alleging that the canal he was building on his
property constituted a continuing trespass on their lake. Guest Pond
sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and was granted one
without any notice to Mr. Smith. Following a hearing, Guest Pond
received the relief it sought, an award for attorney fees, and expenses
against Smith. At some point during the litigation, Smith sought to
recuse Judge Bessonnette, the juvenile court judge sitting by designation, on the ground that his court colleague, Judge Sutton, was counsel
for Guest Pond.'2 4
After dealing with the obvious procedural irregularities in the trial
court's entry of a final order without first hearing the case for temporary
relief, the court addressed the denial of appellant's motion to recuse
Judge Bessonnette.2 The court noted that the Judicial Qualifications
Commission ("JQC") had already found it improper for a judge to preside
in a case in which one of the parties held a judicial office in that
circuit. 128 The court then had little trouble applying the same princi-

ple to cases in which one of the party's lawyers held such a position
because of the "confidential relationship between attorneys and their
clients." 27
The court insisted that its decision was based on the mere appearance
of impropriety, concluding there was no evidence of actual impropriety.128 However, the court's opinion indicates that it relied on additional evidence. First, the court was careful to point out that Bessonnette and Sutton "confer regularly" in their capacities as the only circuit
juvenile court judges with authority to ratify each other's designations
as superior court judges. 2 Indeed, the court determined the record
was replete with orders in which the judges ratified each other's appointments. 30 Second, because Judge Bessonnette should have recused
himself in the first place, there was no real need to go into the fine, even
obvious, procedural points about the court's entry of a final order
following the issuance of a TRO."' The case should have simply been
a non-starter from day one and all orders issued by Judge Bessonnette

124. Smith, 277 Ga. at 143, 145, 586 S.E.2d at 624-25.
125. Id. at 143, 586 S.E.2d at 624.
126. Id. at 146, 586 S.E.2d at 626. See Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 220 (1997)
available at http://www2.state.ga.us/courtssupreme/jqc220.htm.
127. Smith, 277 Ga. at 146, 586 S.E.2d at 626.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 146-47, 586 S.E.2d at 626.
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properly regarded as void ab intio.'3 ' Third, the court of appeals
pointed out that the trial court's final order, in which it seemingly
delegated some of its authority over the issues at hand to the Guest
Pond's board of directors, was improper.133 If recusal under Canon
Two is really about the perception that a judge is not carrying out his
job with impartiality,13 4 it is hard to imagine many circumstances that
would be more likely to make the public suspicious than having a judge,
who should never have decided the case in the first place, hand the keys
to the courthouse over to a colleague and his colleague's client.
In Georgia Transmission, decided by the court of appeals just eight
months later, Judge Blitch heard a condemnation case involving lands
owned by superior court Judge Dane Perkins, Blitch's judicial circuit
colleague.' 35 After the special master issued his report finding that
the condemnation was unnecessary and pursued in bad faith, Georgia
Transmission sought Blitch's recusal, pointing to the "inherent 'interrelationship and affiliation between and among' judges serving on the same
court."3 6 The motion to recuse was based on the relationship between
Blitch and Perkins as colleagues and also the fact that Sutton, a parttime judge in the circuit, was counsel.'3 7 For reasons that are undis38
closed in the opinion, the judge denied the motion to recuse1
Despite Georgia Transmission's untimely filing of the motion to recuse,
139
First, the
the court of appeals reversed for a number of reasons.
court relied on Bessonnette's disqualification in Smith, where the judge
and counsel were colleagues, an explicit extension of the JQC's ruling
that "it is inappropriate for any trial court judge to preside in any action
wherein one of the parties holds a judicial office on the same or any
Second, the court
other court which sits in the same circuit."140
determined that a judge presiding over a colleague's own case could not
possibly escape Canon Two's prohibition against the "appearance of
impropriety." 4 ' Third, the court of appeals followed Smith, which
applied the JQC opinion, and held that

132. Id. at 147, 586 S.E.2d at 626.
133. Id.
134. See Robertson, 277 Ga. at 834, 596 S.E.2d at 6.
135. Ga. Transmission, 267 Ga. App. at 575, 600 S.E.2d at 382.
136. Id. at 576, 600 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting Ga. Transmission's motion to recuse).
137. Id. at 575-76, 600 S.E.2d at 382.
138. Id. at 576, 600 S.E.2d at 382.
139. Id.
140. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 220 (1997) available at http:/www2.state.
ga.us/courts/supremejqc220.htm.
141. Id.
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even without a showing of actual bias, prejudice or unfairness, and
it is
regardless of the merits or timeliness of a Motion to Recuse ....
inappropriate for any trial court judge to preside in any action wherein
office on the same or any other court
one of the parties holds a judicial
142
which sits in the same circuit.
As for why the motion to recuse was denied in the first place, that
remains a mystery.
V.
A.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

MalpracticeAffidavits

Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin,LLP 143 is yet another appellate
case interpreting the statute'" requiring that a malpractice complaint
be accompanied by an expert's affidavit of merit. Here, plaintiffs
originally sued Morris Manning for legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty, among other things. The trial court's dismissal of the
legal malpractice claim for failure to include the proper expert affidavit
was affirmed in 2002,' but the other claims did not suffer the same
fate. On remand, plaintiffs avoided the effects of the malpractice
affidavit requirement by recasting their claims as intentional ones,
although some claims, traditionally reserved for lawyers, such as breach
of fiduciary duty, were still included. 1 " Defendants cried foul, arguing
plaintiffs' failure to comply with the affidavit requirements made the
case a nullity from the start. This was not a novel argument because
the court previously reached a similiar conclusion, 47 albeit in a
slightly different context. Although the case is not explicit, defendants
presumably argued that permitting this amendment would allow
plaintiffs to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish
directly; namely, the amendment would allow plaintiffs to sue a lawyer
for dereliction of duty without using a proper malpractice affidavit to
begin the case.

142. Ga. Transmission,267 Ga. App. at 577,600 S.E.2d at 383 (quoting Smith v. Guest
Pond Club, Inc., 277 Ga. 143, 586 S.E.2d 623 (2003)).
143. 264 Ga. App. 24, 589 S.E.2d 840 (2004).
144. "In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice.., the plaintiff shall
be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert. . . which.., shall set forth
specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for
each such claim." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(2) (1998).
145. Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 254 Ga. App. 355, 562 S.E.2d 725
(2002).
146. Smith, 264 Ga. App. at 24, 589 S.E.2d at 840.
147. See Grier-Baxter v. Sibley, 247 Ga. App. 560, 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001).
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Relying mostly upon the general amendment statute, 148 the court
agreed with plaintiffs. 149 Judge Ruffin, who presided, wrote, "[niotwithstanding any similarities between these claims and Smith's prior
professional negligence claims, the fact remains that they allege
intentional wrongdoing.""5
The court found its hands tied by the
general amendment rule and the fact that the expert affidavit statute
does not expressly prohibit amendments.'' This case offers litigants
a perfect opportunity to sue a lawyer for failure to properly perform his
lawyerly duties without first jumping through the expert affidavit hoop.
All a litigant must do is add a claim for intentional misconduct or insert
the word "intentionally," undeterred by our pleading rules, because
allegations of "[malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition[s] of mind
...may be averred generally."'
B.

Substantive Elements

The survey period produced several interesting cases in the legal
malpractice area, even if none really broke new ground in a profound
way. All were decided by the court of appeals. In Blackwell v.
Potts,153 on April 15, 1991, nurse Shirley Goodwin allegedly committed
malpractice upon patient Rita Blackwell by improperly administering an
injection to her. In March 1993 the Blackwells' lawyer, Blaska, sued
Goodwin for malpractice.
By August 1996 the Blackwells were
dissatisfied with Blaska and relieved him of his duties; new counsel,
Potts and Badaruddin, entered appearances in the case in November of
that same year. At a January 1997 pretrial conference, Potts announced
he was not ready for trial and intended to refile when he was able to get
adequate expert testimony for the case. After a discussion with the
judge,' the court dismissed the case. 55

148. O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(a) permits amendments "as a matter of course and
without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order." Id. This extremely
liberal amendment rule says nothing of any special application to malpractice cases.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) (2002). Cf. FED. R. Cw. P. 15.
149. Smith, 264 Ga. App. at 27, 589 S.E.2d at 844.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 25, 589 S.E.2d at 843.
152. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b) (2002).
153. 266 Ga. App. 702, 598 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
154. Potts alleges that the judge told him that because he had only recently been
retained, he could dismiss and refile when he was up to speed in the case. The judge's
order denying Potts's subsequent motion to set aside the dismissal disputes that
characterization of her statements at the pretrial conference. Id. at 702, 598 S.E.2d at 2.

155. Id. at 703, 598 S.E.2d at 2.
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However, when Potts refiled in March 1997, defendants successfully
moved to dismiss pursuant to the Georgia statute of ultimate repose.156
After the trial court refused to set aside the dismissal,'57 the Blackwells filed a second malpractice suit, this time against Potts and
Badaruddin because the attorneys dismissed their pending case without
first insuring they could safely refile. In their motion for summary
judgment, defendant lawyers argued that the court could only judge
their actions by the state of the file as it existed when they took the
case. In other words, any evidence plaintiffs introduced about the
nurse's negligence'- was irrelevant because the file defendant lawyers
inherited from Blaska did not contain such evidence, and it was
impossible for them to get it in time for the quick trial the judge
demanded at the pretrial conference.' 59
The trial court agreed,
granting their motion in limine to exclude further medical evidence,"6
saying "the case must be judged on the circumstances... as it existed
at the time the defendants represented the plaintiffs." 6'
Though not entirely unsympathetic to the lawyers, the court of appeals
saw the inherent risk in agreeing with them. 2 The court concluded
that adopting the lawyers' position would allow any attorney to "avoid
liability by intentionally or negligently failing to develop a record. In
the event of a legal malpractice action ... the defendant-attorney could
then prevail simply by relying on the sparse record occasioned by his or
her own action or inaction."" In some respects this result might seem
unfair to Potts and Badaruddin because they came into the case late,

156. O.C.G.A. section 9-3-71(a) provides that "an action for medical malpractice shall
be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a
negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) (1982 & Supp. 2004).
O.C.G.A. section 9-3-71(b) then provides that "in no event may an action for medical
malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which the negligent or
wrongful act or omission occurred." Id. § 9-3-71(b). O.C.G.A. section 9-3-71(c) states that
subsection (b) "is intended to create a five year statute of ultimate repose and abrogation."
Id. § 9-3-71(c).
157. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) (2004). On its face, this rule applies only to setting
aside judgments, not voluntary dismissals.
158. Of course in order to prevail in their malpractice case against Potts and
Badaruddin, plaintiffs had to demonstrate that they would have prevailed in the
underlying medical malpractice case, if it had been properly handled.
159. Blackwell, 266 Ga. App. at 707, 598 S.E.2d at 5.
160. Plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence that defendants should have obtained "more
suitable experts." Although the opinion does not fully explain how this happened,
apparently the opinion that defendants could and should have done so came from the
defendants' own doctor/lawyer expert. Id. at 704, 598 S.E.2d at 3.
161. Id. at 705, 598 S.E.2d at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 706, 598 S.E.2d at 4.
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and it had apparently been poorly developed. Furthermore, the lawyers
were under the impression the trial judge said they could, and even
should, dismiss the case without adverse consequences."
. Two facts should be borne in mind before concluding the lawyers got
a raw deal from the court of appeals. First, the trial judge who presided
over the original pretrial conference, at which the lawyers dismissed the
case, did not actually force the lawyers to dismiss; in any event, the
judge was unaware of any special problems with the underlying
case.'65 Thus, before following any of the judge's suggestions, the
lawyers should have made certain it was safe to do so. This would seem
especially appropriate given how old the case already was.'66
Second, Potts and Badaruddin had a duty to fully examine the case as
it was presented to them after Blaska was dismissed. This examination
would include the realities of the state of the file, as well as the statutes
of limitation and repose. When asked to take the case, the lawyers had
two choices. The first was to refuse to take the case at all, given its
16 7
inherent dangers. Obviously, they had a perfect right to do so.
Second, the lawyers could have immediately gathered the necessary
evidence; more to the point, they could have presented the trial judge
with support for their argument that the case was not ripe for trial, due
to no fault of their own.
McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Keller"6 could easily be dismissed as just another in a line of cases generally holding that one may
not sue a lawyer with whom one has no attorney-client relationship.'69
If there is no relationship and no consequent duty, there can be no
liability. On another level, however, the case may stand for something
more profound. The facts are simple enough. Mr. Keller left his job at
First Atlanta Securities to work for Neidiger Tucker Bruner. About a
month later, First Atlanta's lawyers at Long, Aldridge & Norman sent
counsel for Keller and First Atlanta a letter suggesting that Keller may

164. Id. at 702-03, 598 S.E.2d at 2.
165. Id. at 707, 598 S.E.2d at 5.
166. The negligence allegedly occurred in 1991 and they took the case over in 1996.
167. Of course, for American lawyers, "it has never been professional orthodoxy that
a lawyer is required to represent any particular client." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2.2, (student ed.); see also Former Ethical Consideration 2-26 which
states: "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who
may wish to become a client; but ... a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered
employment." Ethical Consideration,supra note 35, at 26-H.
168. 267 Ga. App. 171, 598 S.E.2d 892 (2004).
169. See, e.g., Legacy Homes, Inc. v. Cole, 205 Ga. App. 34, 421 S.E.2d 127 (1992)
(determing that one party to a real estate closing may not sue the other party's attorney);
Driebe v. Cox, 203 Ga. App. 8, 416 S.E.2d 314 (1992).

2004]

LEGAL ETHICS

335

have violated covenants he entered into with First Atlanta by taking
some proprietary information with him when he left their employ.
Keller then sued the lawyers at Long Aldridge, alleging negligence and
several other claims, including libel. The trial court 17
denied
the lawyers'
0
motion for judgment on the pleadings on all claims.
The court of appeals had no trouble concluding that some of Keller's
claims against the lawyers had no valid basis, given the fact that the
lawyers had no relationship with him.'
Thus, the court reversed the
trial court's denial of the motion on the pleadings for the negligence
claim. 72 But the court of appeals went further.173 At the end of its
opinion, the court said, "Keller argues that even if his negligence claims
are dismissed, his [claim] for libel ... should survive . . . . "'
Keller
argued that the fault in his negligence claim, the lack of a lawyer-client
relationship with defendants, should have no effect on his libel claim
against them.'75 The court disagreed with Keller's notion and stated:
[A]ll his claims arise from the alleged negligent failure on the part of
Long Aldridge to investigate adequately its client's allegations against
Keller before sending the demand letter. Long Aldridge owed no legal
duty to Keller giving rise to a claim in negligence, and the trial court
erred in denying [the] motion for judgment on the pleadings.176
Because the court of appeals had previously spoken of only one motion
for judgment on the pleadings, it appears as though it reversed the lower
court's decision on all of plaintiff's claims. In other words, not only is
Keller's ordinary negligence claim barred by the lack of a relationship
with the lawyer defendants, his libel and other related non-malpractice
claims are barred for the same reason. This is a novel holding, to say
the least, and raises the question of whether lawyers have just been
granted a whole new line of defense in Georgia cases. More likely, the
court of appeals has merely been a bit too casual with its wording, but
it is impossible to say at this time.
Not all cases against lawyers raise such esoteric issues. If one believes
all of plaintiff's allegations, Mays v. Askin' 71 is a classic story of a real
estate lawyer pulling a fast one on an unsuspecting seller of valuable
timber property. Retired schoolteacher Mays, on behalf of herself and

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

McKenna, 267 Ga. App. at 171-72, 598 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 174, 598 S.E.2d at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
262 Ga. App. 417, 585 S.E.2d 735 (2003).
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as executrix of her father's estate, was approached by Mr. Troupe and
his lawyer, Askin, about buying timber. According to Mays, Askin,
Troupe, or both, misled her about the sale documents she signed, the
amount she received for the property, the real identity of the ultimate
buyer,178 and who was responsible for various costs and taxes, among
other things.'7 9 In the end Mays likely received a bad deal because
"Troupe paid nothing while Mays paid the costs of conveyance and much
more."8 0 More than four years after the closing date of the sale, Mays
sued Askin for both malpractice and fraud. The trial court granted
Askin's motion for summary judgment.' 8 '
The court of appeals noted several allegations to support a fraud
claim, as well as reasons to extend the statute of limitations.8 2 The
more interesting part of the case concerns the claim for malpractice. It
is well established that the lawyer representing one party to a real
estate closing does not, merely by conducting the closing, form an
attorney-client relationship with the other party."
In this case,
however, there was conflicting evidence on what role Askin played in
relation to Mays. Not only did Mays end up paying all of Askin's
attorney fees in the closing, it appeared that Askin may have given
Mays legal advice about the contract, including its meaning, its terms,
and even its enforceability.'8
Thus, the court quite correctly determined that plaintiff had raised a jury question on the issue of whether
Askin was acting as Mays's attorney, either solely or at the same time
he represented Troupe.'
This case should be a lesson for attorneys
who casually enter into real estate negotiations, transactions, and
closings; a failure to obtain a clear, written understanding of the
lawyer's role and loyalties to the parties involved can have devastating
consequences. It also makes one question the wisdom of the supreme

178. Id. at 417, 585 S.E.2d at 736. Shortly after the sale, the finances of which were
questionable, Askin facilitated an immediate transfer of the timber from Troupe to a forest
products company, for substantially more than Mays received. Id.
179. Id. During the course of the events, the estate was represented by lawyer Sidney
Shepard, who testified that he was never contacted about any of this. Id.
180. Id. at 421, 585 S.E.2d at 739.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 417-22, 585 S.E.2d at 735-39. The statute of limitations is tolled if the
attorney prevented the client from finding out about the fraud's existence. Hunter,
Maclean, Exley & Dunn v. Frame, 269 Ga. 844, 850, 507 S.E.2d 411 (1998).
183. Guillebeau v. Jenkins, 182 Ga. App. 225, 355 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
184. Mays, 262 Ga. App. at 420, 585 S.E.2d at 738.
185. Id. As Mays's expert opined, if he had done that, he would have needed to get
"'written consent or provide a written disclosure to Ms. Mays, and he has admitted he has

not provided anything in writing.' Id.
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court's insistence that lawyers always serve the public best by putting
a real estate transaction to rest.
Paul v. Smith, Gambrell & Russell'" raised a novel question in the
Georgia law of legal malpractice-whether a lawyer's client, against
whom a jury awards punitive damages, may pass liability for those
damages on to his allegedly malpracticing lawyer. Paul v. Destito8 7
began with complicated corporate deals involving Destito and the Pauls,
all clients of the Smith Gambrell firm. Eventually, Destito sued the
Pauls, who were represented by Smith Gambrell in the litigation as well.
Destito recovered both compensatory and punitive damages, demonstrating that the Pauls acted maliciously and dishonestly in their dealings
with Destito.' ss The verdict was upheld on appeal." 9
The Pauls then sued Smith Gambrell for malpractice for their
representation of the Pauls in Destito's lawsuit. A key allegation was
that the Smith Gambrell lawyers decided not to call an expert accounting witness at trial, which defendants characterized as an honest
exercise of professional judgment.' 90 The trial court held that the
lawyers were immune from malpractice liability because the lawyers'
action was a strategic trial decision, the idea being that such liability
would encourage endless litigation by every losing party .191
On appeal plaintiffs argued the lawyers lost the benefit of this
immunity by virtue of an underlying conflict of interest in representing
the Pauls, namely because they also represented Destito.' 92 The court
of appeals agreed, in principle, holding that plaintiffs had raised a jury
issue as to whether Smith Gambrell's conflict had a "real or subconscious
effect" on their judgment during their representation, which would
The decision on that point seems correct
nullify the defense. 93
because the litigator must exercise independent professional judgment
on the client's behalf when making strategic decisions, and the litigator
must remain unaffected by interests of other persons. 9 4
The more difficult question was whether the Pauls, if they could
recover for malpractice, could also recover for the punitive damages

186. 267 Ga. App. 107, 599 S.E.2d 206 (2004).
187. 250 Ga. App. 631, 550 S.E.2d 739 (2001).
188. Id. at 642-43, 550 S.E.2d at 748.
189. Id. at 631, 550 S.E.2d at 739.
190. Paul, 267 Ga. App. at 109, 599 S.E.2d at 209.
191. Id. (citing Allen Decorating, Inc. v. Oxendine, 225 Ga. App. 84, 88 (1997); Hudson
v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882, 886 (1992)).
192. See id. at 108-09, 599 S.E.2d at 208-09.
193. Id. at 111, 599 S.E.2d at 210.
194. See GA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT, R. 2.1, 1.7 cmt. 4, supra note 8, at H-28.
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Here, the
assessed against them in Destito's underlying action.19
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment,
quickly concluding that as a matter of public policy it is inappropriate
to allow plaintiffs to "shift their tort liability for punitive damages that
... were specifically found by clear and convincing evidence to have
[been] caused intentionally." 196 This rule makes perfect sense in the
majority of instances. However, given the court's recognition in the first
part of the opinion that a conflict of interest could have had a "real or
subconscious effect on the judgment of counsel by creating divided
loyalties" to plaintiff and defendant in the underlying trial, it seems
inappropriate to apply that rule here.' 97 After all, if the lawyers' very
loyalty was affected in the underlying case and so were their strategic
decisions therein, it is not much of a stretch to suggest plaintiffs may
never have been found liable had their lawyers had nothing but the
Consider again that Smith Gambrell
clients' interests in mind.
represented the Pauls, both in the underlying transactions with Destito
and in Destito's suit when he charged the Pauls with fraud. An
independent lawyer, representing the Pauls at trial in Destito's case,
may very well have attempted to shift the blame for any alleged
inappropriate behavior to the lawyers at Smith Gambrell, who may have
been responsible for the Pauls' actions which harmed Destito.
Whether such a strategy would have been used, or successful if used,
is beside the point, as is the question of whether Smith Gambrell's
strategy was actually dictated by its conflict. The point is that the
Smith Gambrell lawyers could not have been totally objective about the
wisdom of their initial advice to the Pauls or the best way to keep the
Pauls out of trouble when the deal soured. 9 ' The court seemed to
understand this because it stated that "proof of the existence of a conflict
also gives rise to the reasonable inference that such conflict influenced
the exercise of discretion ....""' In other words the lawyers' very
actions in conducting the trial could have been negatively affected by
their loyalty to someone other than their client, whether it be Destito or
themselves. That being the case, it is possible that the lawyers' proper
exercise of discretion would have prevented the punitive damages
judgment, or even the entire judgment itself, from ever being made.
Allowing for such a possibility would undermine the court's basic concern
that only those actually guilty of intentional misconduct should pay. It

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Paul, 267 Ga. App. at 112, 599 S.E.2d at 210-11.
Id. at 113, 599 S.E.2d at 211.
Id. at 111, 599 S.E.2d at 210.
Id.
Id.
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would have the same effect as making lawyers pay for underlying
judgments that never would have been entered against their clients in
the first place, which is, of course, what malpractice cases are all about.
Traub v. Washington °. reads like something from a John Grisham
novel, or, at least, a professional responsibility exam. Sandra Traub and
Glenn Connor, sister and brother, were estranged from each other when
their mother died. Connor suggested they jointly hire Washington, a
lawyer well known to him. When Traub raised the obvious questions
about a conflict of interest, Washington reputedly told her that hiring
multiple lawyers would be too expensive and unnecessary.'O
Connor and Traub began to feud over aspects of their mother's estate,
and Traub became suspicious of Washington and Connor. Traub wrote
Washington, informing him that she would no longer authorize his fees,
at which point Washington agreed to represent Connor alone, apparently
seeing no conflict in doing so. Washington even filed a petition to
remove Traub as co-executor.2 °2
In the meantime Traub's suspicions about the relationship between
Connor and Washington proved to be merited. While Traub was still coexecutor, and purportedly represented by Washington, Connor provided
Washington a document suggesting that Traub and her mother, or both,
may owe a good deal of money to a Mr. Hunter. Apparently concerned
that this could jeopardize the interests of the estate, Connor had
Washington search the public records for any judgments or liens against
Traub. Washington also followed up by speaking with Mr. Hunter and
consulting with another lawyer, Mr. Metz. Astonishingly, Washington
sued Traub, by this point a former client, on Hunter's behalf. He then
executed the judgment via a garnishment to collect the debt from
Traub's estate proceeds."'
2 4
In
Traub sued Washington and Metz, as well as her brother.
summary
for
motion
his
of
denial
Washington's appeal from the
judgment on the malpractice claim, he argued that Traub's claim of
25
malpractice was "based solely on breach of ethical duties, not on any

200. 264 Ga. App. 541, 591 S.E.2d 382 (2003).
201. Id. at 542, 591 S.E.2d at 384. Because this was already identified as an easy
professional responsibility exam, it goes without saying that the lawyer may have been
wrong or dishonest, or both, in giving Traub such advice. See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 8, at H-28.
202. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 542, 591 S.E.2d at 384.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 541, 591 S.E.2d at 382.
205. Traub's expert's affidavit apparently charged Washington with conflicts of interest
and taking actions against Traub to gain an advantage for Connor.
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This argument may have been based on a
act of negligence. "2"'
misunderstanding of the principle that mere violation of a rule of ethical
conduct does not, by itself, constitute malpractice.2 7 As the supreme
court has noted before, the principle does not mean that a violation of
the rules is irrelevant. 2" It may, however, explain why the court
never cited a single relevant Rule of Professional Conduct, even while
emphasizing the evidence that Washington represented both Connor and
questions and petitioned to have Traub
Traub after Traub raised
2
removed as co-executor. 0
The most interesting claim is that Washington may have committed
malpractice by using "confidential information gained in the process of
representing Traub to her detriment." 2 0 The court seemed to have
lifted the idea directly from the Rules of Professional Conduct,2 '
despite its attempts to separate the malpractice and discipline issues.
Truthfully, this allegation seems more like a basis for a breach of
fiduciary duty claim,2 12 but even so, it is interesting on two counts.
First, it is not obvious what detriment or disadvantage, if any, Traub
suffered from the use of the information. To the extent there were debts
outstanding, she obviously could be sued for them at any time. If the
debts were already reduced to judgments and liens, all that remained
was to collect on them. While Traub was not actively pursued by her
creditors until Washington's actions, she had no legal right to remain
exempt from collection. Nevertheless, the jury is still out on the
question of whether our Rules contemplate the payment of debts, some
of which were already reduced to judgments, as detrimental. Even the

206. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 543, 591 S.E.2d at 385.
207. "The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a
They are not designed to be a basis
presumption that a legal duty has been breached ....
for civil liability." See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble, cmt. 18, supra note 8, at
H-24.
208. See Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 265 Ga. 374,376,453 S.E.2d
719 (1995).
209. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 544, 591 S.E.2d at 386. See GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 17, supra note 8, at H-28.
210. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 544, 591 S.E.2d at 385-86.
211. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b) prohibits a lawyer from using "information
gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client...
See GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.8(b), supra note 8, at H-29.
212. '[A] lawyer must, in matters within the scope of representation... comply with
obligations concerning the client's confidences... and not employ advantages arising from
the client-lawyer relationship .... " See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 16(3) (2000).

20041

LEGAL ETHICS

341

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"),
which is vague on that point, 213 excludes from the definition of "confidential information" that which is generally known, including those claims
reduced to judgments and/or liens.2 14
Second, it is debatable whether the information should have been
treated as confidential at all.215 All of the information that Washington used against Traub seems to have come from Washington's
communications with Connor. Connor initially suggested that Washington search the public records and Traub's finances. Then Connor
presented Washington with documents found in the mother's home,
evidencing a debt from Traub, the mother, or both.216 Nevertheless,
had Washington used any of that information to Traub's detriment,217
he would have violated the ABA's model versions of both Rule 1.6218
and 1.8.219 Each rule turns on the lawyer's revelation or use of any
information "relating to representation," basically the same phrase used
to define the scope of confidentiality in the Restatement.22 ° Unlike the
Model Rules, the Restatement makes a substantial effort to define the
term. 221 The Restatement makes it clear it does not matter where the
information originates, what form it takes, whether it is discoverable, or
whether a fee was paid for the information.222 The Restatement even

213.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 60 cmt. c(i) (2000)

states that "use or disclosure of confidential client information is generally prohibited if
there is a reasonable prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the
client. . . ." It is not clear whether collecting on debts already owed, but not yet collected,
would fall within that prohibition. Id. § 60 cmt. c(i).
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYER § 59 (2000), defines
confidential information as "information relating to representation of a client, other than
information that is generally known." Id. § 59.
215. The word "confidential" is not used here in reference to the attorney-client
privilege, but rather, refers to that information protected by the Rules of Professional
Conduct. See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, supra note 8, at H-27.
216. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 542, 591 S.E.2d at 384.
217. See earlier discussion about whether use of the information to collect on debts
already reduced to judgments and liens was really to Traub's detriment or disadvantage.
218. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004), supra note 30, at 83. "A
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client.. . ." Id.
219. Id. R. 1.8. "A lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation of
a client to the disadvantage of the client .. " Id. R. 1.8(b), at 139.
220. The ABA rules refer to information "relating to the representation of a client. . .
Section 59 of the Restatement leaves out the word "the" before "representation," referring
to "information relating to representation of a client. . . ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000).
221. Id. § 59, cmt. b.
222. Id.
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covers information the lawyer learns that is "relevant to representation
of a client in the course of representing another client ....
This is a point on which the Model Rules and the Georgia version of
the Rules of Professional Conduct differ, and the difference may actually
matter. In Georgia Rule 1.6, on confidentiality, and Rule 1.8,224 on
conflicts, both speak of a lawyer's obligations respecting "information
gained in the professional relationship."225 The meaning of this phrase
has always been somewhat problematic 22 because it may have one of
two alternate meanings. If it is a temporal requirement, then all of the
information about Traub and her debts may be covered under Washington's obligations not to reveal or use the information to her detriment
because he learned it during the course of her representation. On the
other hand, if it is a causal requirement, Washington's obligations are
not so clear. It seems likely that Connor would have given all of this
information and documentation to Washington even if Traub had not
also been represented by him. Regarding Connor's sister's debts, their
mere estrangement from one another could have been enough of a
motivator to cause him to use the information. Also, Connor's intention
may have been to make certain that the documents found at their
mother's house fell into the hands of the person most likely to present
them as Traub's debt alone and not of his mother. In other words this
may not have been information gained as a result of Traub's professional
relationship. Thus, it is possible that our courts should not treat this as
confidential information, regardless of the resolution of the detriment
question.
Finally, the court backhandedly criticized Washington's representation
of Hunter against Traub when it stated that, "[in spite of his former
representationof Traub as co-executor, Washington represented Hunter
in an action against Traub to collect the debt."227 Putting aside the
earlier question of whether suing Traub on her debts was really to her
detriment at all, it seems the court was concerned about Washington's
suit against Traub. There is a good chance the court believed Washing-

223. Id.
224. Even if a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not itself constitute
a cause of action, such violations are relevant. See Allen, 265 Ga. at 376, 453 S.E.2d at
719.
225. "A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional
relationship with a client." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.6(a), supra note 8, at H-27.
"A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client
to the disadvantage of the client ... ." Id. R. 1.8(b), at H-29.
226. See Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 51 MERCER L. REv. 353, 356 (1999).
227. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 543, 591 S.E.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
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ton's actions ran afoul of the prohibition against suing a former client in
certain circumstances. That concern is worth examining.
At its most basic, "[a) lawyer who has formerly represented a client in
a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client ... ."2' The
question then is whether the debts Traub allegedly owed to Hunter, or
the others who already had judgments against her, were matters
substantially related to the estate case. Arguably, they are not related.
There is no reason to think that any of the debts Traub herself had
accumulated over the years had anything to do with the estate or
Washington's representation of her. However, the case is closer as to the
debt that either Traub, her mother, or both may have owed to Hunter.
Washington came into possession of the document evidencing the debt
during the representation of Connor and Traub.229 If the mother owed
the debt, the net value of the estate could be affected.23 ° In resolving
the relatedness issue, "[t]he underlying question is whether the lawyer
was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question."2 31
It is not as if Washington had previously represented Traub in a case
with Hunter and then switched sides. Whatever obligations Traub
might have owed to Hunter pre-dated her representation by Washington.
If Traub's debt to Hunter cut into her inheritance, that had nothing to
do with Washington. As far as the mother and the estate were
concerned, Washington never represented them in the first place.
Of course that does not exhaust the limits on prohibitions against
opposing former clients in Georgia. The Georgia courts imposed a
slightly more onerous prohibition than that which exists in other states.
Assuming the adoption of Rule 1.9232 does not occupy the field in this
area and impliedly overrule other related rules,233 the supreme court

228. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a), supra note 8, at H-31. See Tilley v. King,
190 Ga. 421, 9 S.E.2d 670 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Ga. 602, 19 S.E.2d 281
(1942).
229. Traub, 264 Ga. App. at 542, 591 S.E.2d at 385.
230. Id. at 542-43, 591 S.E.2d at 385-86.
231. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 2, supra note 8, at H-31.
232. Id. R. 1.9, supra note 8, at H-31. "Alawyer who has formerly represented a client
in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter . . . ." Id. R. 1.9(a), at H-31.
233. There is nothing in the Rules that directly addresses this question. Presumably,
the case law is unaffected by the adoption of the Rules, but since the case was grounded
in the appearance of impropriety and that principle is completely absent from the Rules
of Professional Conduct, one can make the argument that Yerby has been displaced.
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has held that even if the matters for a current and former client are not
substantially related, the lawyer's representation may, nevertheless, be
improper under the Yerby rule.2"
The Yerby rule arises from a case in which a lawyer represented
Crawford Long Hospital in several medical malpractice suits over a long
period of time. When the lawyer left to pursue a private practice, he
represented a plaintiff who filed a medical malpractice case against the
hospital, which objected." 5 Even though the case was not factually
related to any the lawyer had previously handled for the hospital, the
court held the representation improper.u6 The court determined there
existed an appearance of impropriety because the case was the same
"general subject matter" and arose "during the time" of his representation of the hospital. 3 7 Both of the Yerby rule requirements are
questionable in the Traub case. First, it is doubtful the court would
regard a pre-existing debt and the estate case as the same general
subject matter. Second, while the information may have come to light
during the course of Washington's representation of Traub, the preexisting debts and liens themselves did not. The primary concern from
Yerby is the need to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of their
positions with clients, whereby they would acquire "knowledge (imparted
to the lawyer by the client) of practices, policies, procedures, reporting
requirements, and of ongoing or recurring problems ...
28 Traub
would be hard pressed to argue that her case raised any such issue.
That being the case, the theory that Washington inappropriately used
confidential information to Traub's detriment is questionable.

VI.

DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL

Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Reddick2 39 raised an issue about using
disqualification as a remedy for a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. In most respects the court of appeals affirms existing law,
concluding both that disqualification is a discretionary remedy open to
the trial court as one method of dealing with unethical conduct and that
standing to disqualify for a conflict of interest exists only for "those as
to whom the attorney in question sustains... the relation of attorney
and client."2

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Crawford W. Long Mem'l Hosp. v. Yerby, 258 Ga. 720, 373 S.E.2d 749 (1988).
Id.

Id. at 722, 373 S.E.2d at 751.
Id.
Id. at 721, 373 S.E.2d at 750.
267 Ga. App. 68, 599 S.E.2d 20 (2004).
Id. at 86, 599 S.E.2d at 28.
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In dealing with defendant hospital's motion to disqualify plaintiff's
counsel for communicating with hospital agents, the court may have
inadvertently raised a question about the continued effect of a Formal
Advisory Opinion rendered by the supreme court before its adoption of
the existing Rules of Professional Conduct. The question was a simple,
yet troubling, one: Under what circumstances may counsel for one party
contact an employee of an organizational opponent, without first getting
permission of opposing counsel?
According to the court of appeals, the prohibition would apply to any
one of three classes of employees: (1) those with "managerial responsibility," (2) those "whose act[s] or omission[s]" may be imputed to the
hospital in the subject matter of the case, or (3) those whose statement
24
... could "constitute an admission on the part of the [hospital]." '
This reading of the anti-contact rule, taken directly from the comments
to Georgia's Rule 4.2,242 is consistent with most jurisdictions' view of
the rule.2 3 Therefore, it was the court's intention to merely state and
apply the existing Georgia rule.
However, the court of appeals anti-contact rule may not actually be
the Georgia rule. In 1989 the supreme court adopted FormalAdvisory
Opinion 87-624 addressing the very same question. Having no rule
that directly answered the question, 2' the court looked to an old ABA
Informal Opinion 21 for guidance. Following the old opinion, the court

241. Id. at 85, 599 S.E.2d at 27.
242. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4A, supra note 8, at H-45.
243.
[A] current employee or other agent of an organization represented by a lawyer:
(a) if the employee or other agent supervises, directs, or regularly consults with
the lawyer concerning the matter or if the agent has power to compromise or
settle the matter; (b) if the acts or omissions of the employee or other agent may
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability in the
matter; or (c) ifa statement of the employee or other agent, under applicable rules
of evidence, would have the effect of binding the organization with respect to proof
of the matter.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 100(2) (2000).
244. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 87-6 (1987), supra note 8, at H-91.
245. Standard of Conduct 47 prohibited conduct with represented parties without the
written consent of opposing counsel, but it said nothing about whether employees of
organizational parties were covered by the Rules. Standard 47 was based on Directory
Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Standards of Conduct
were the enforceable rules of conduct, for the violation of which one could be disciplined,
while the Directory Rules were aspirational only. See Part IV: Discipline, Rule 4-101,
supra note 35, at 40-H.
246. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1410 (1978)
(interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1)).
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applied the prohibition to two categories of employees.24 The first was
to "an officer or director or other employee with authority to bind the
corporation," and the second was to employees "whose acts or omissions
may be imputed to the corporation in relation to the subject matter of
the case."2" The prohibition seemed simple enough in 1989, a full
twelve years before Georgia adopted its own version of the Rules of
Professional Conduct in 2001.
Thus, we have a potential problem. Both opinions encompass
employees who are managers and the like, even if they use slightly
different language. Both encompass persons whose acts might be
imputed to the corporation, as well. But the court of appeals extends the
prohibition to a third category of employees, those whose "statement[s]
... could constitute an admission,"24 9 based upon the comments to
Rule 4.2.250 While the comments are important, they are only "guides
25
to interpretation ... [while] the text of each Rule is authoritative. '
Has the court of appeals inadvertently prohibited lawyers from speaking
to persons with whom the supreme court, in its advisory opinion, never
prohibited them to speak?
It is possible that the categories look different but really are not. If
"bind[ing] the corporation " 112 refers to making decisions by which the
corporation is legally bound, such as negotiating and settlement
positions, then the court of appeals rule and the advisory opinion rule
are not the same. But if the phrase "bind the corporation" refers to
making admissions by which the organizational entity will be bound as
a matter of evidence law, then this first category collapses the managerial category and the admissions category together into one, and thus, all
are consistent. The latter interpretation is more likely the correct one,
especially given the Georgia courts' traditional overlapping treatment of
agency for purposes of acting for a corporation and agency for purposes
of making corporate admissions.2 53
All of this raises an interesting question: If this formal advisory
in a later adopted Rule
opinion 2 ' does in fact conflict with a comment
of Professional Conduct, which one controls? One would think the formal

247. Formal Advisory Op.Bd., Formal Op. 87-6, supra note 8, at H-91.
248. Id.
249. Piedmont Hosp., 267.Ga. App. at 85, 599 S.E.2d at 27.
250. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4A, supra note 8, at H-45.
251. Id. cmt. 21, at H-24.
252. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at H-91.
253. See PAUL S. MIjCH, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON GEORGIA EVIDENCE 13 (2004).
254. At the time Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-6 was issued, all such opinions were
approved by the Supreme Court. See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 8, at H57.
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advisory opinion controls for three reasons. First, it was issued as an
opinion of the supreme court, unlike those opinions issued by either the
Disciplinary Board25 or the Formal Advisory Opinion Board alone.256
Second, it has never been revoked, even as some old opinions were sent
to the dustbin when the Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted to
replace the Code of Professional Responsibility. And third, even though
the Rules are in effect, the answer to this question is found only in the
non-binding comments, not the Rules themselves.
VII. THE LAST WORD IN PROFESSIONALISM
If one point of an article like this is to raise the reader's consciousness
about issues of professionalism, then Sangster v. Dujinski5 7 is the
perfect coda. Sangster raises questions about litigation tactics, the
degree to which trial court judges prevent and deal with serious abuses
of decorum, and whether our current Rules are up to the task of sending
Georgia lawyers a message that certain behavior will not be tolerated.25 8 Before reading about the case, perhaps the reader should be
reminded that our Lawyer's Creed contains the following promise: "To
the. opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and
civility .... To the courts ...I offer respect, candor, and courtesy."5 '

Dujinski sued Sangster for injuries resulting from a "road rage"
incident, recovering less than $700 in actual damages but $150,000 in
Unfortunately, Dujinski may have had the help
punitive damages.
of some rather questionable litigation tactics by her attorney, Eric Hertz,
who claimed to have "[written) the book on punitive damages ....261
Before trial Sangster moved in limine to keep out evidence of his prior
traffic citations, criminal charges, use of alcohol and marijuana, and the
like. The trial court granted the motion and, during trial, refused to
reconsider its decision, but Hertz refused to drop the issue. From
Hertz's opening statement onward, he made reference after reference to
matters the trial court excluded. Despite repeated cautions and motions
for a mistrial, Hertz continued, undaunted, in his attempts to use facts
the court had ordered him not to use. The trial court refused to grant
a mistrial and never issued a verbal rebuke before the jury. 2

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See http://www.gabar.org/sdb.asp.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-403(d), supra note 8, at H-64.
264 Ga. App. 213, 590 S.E.2d 202 (2003).
Id. at 213, 590 S.E.2d at 202.
A Lawyer's Creed,Part IX: Professionalism,supra note 8, at H-128.
Sangster, 264 Ga. App. at 214, 590 S.E.2d at 202.
Id.
Id.
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During closing arguments in the damages phase, Hertz referred to
punitive damages and even commented that the judge did not want the
jury to know "every bad thing this guy has done."2" In Hertz's closing
on punitive damages, he argued things never presented into evidence
and stated that Sangster could just file bankruptcy and avoid paying.
Hertz also repeatedly invoked his personal opinion and made other
grossly inappropriate remarks.2 64 Referring to defendant, he said, "I
I am afraid this guy is going to
was afraid to go to sleep last night ....
show up at my house."2 65 Hertz suggested that opposing counsel was
26
"trying to create facts to make you think things are not there ....
Finally, as to himself, Hertz claimed, "'[wihen I give an oath I put God
my bar license ...
under there.' You can hold me to it. You can hold
26 7
'I do the same thing the district attorney does.'"
Calling these "extreme circumstances," the court of appeals admitted
that "no amount of instruction by the court to disregard ... counsel's
argument could have erased the effect[s]" thereof and reversed the trial
court's denial of Sangster's motion for a new trial.2' A few readers of
the opinion would have expected the court to say something in closing
about referring the matter to Bar Counsel for appropriate actions under
our Rules of Professional Conduct.
But those words never came because our rules do not condemn this
deplorable conduct. 26' ABA Model Rule 3.4(e) states that a lawyer
shall not
in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe ... will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
personal knowledge of facts in issue ... or state a personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, [or] the
culpability of a civil litigant ....
By any reading of the case, Hertz violated this provision.2 7 ' Furthermore, Model Rule 3.4(c) prohibits a lawyer's "knowingly disobey[ing] an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based
on an assertion that no valid obligation exists .... 2 7 2 Any reasonable

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 215, 590 S.E.2d at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 215-16, 590 S.E.2d at 204.
Id.

269.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 30.

270. Id. R. 3.4(e), at 347.
271. Sangster, 264 Ga. App. at 213, 590 S.E.2d at 202.
272.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c), supra note 30, at 347.
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reading of that provision would include a lawyer's deliberate violation of
a court's order prohibiting him from referring to certain evidence during
a trial, thus putting Mr. Hertz in violation of this rule as well.
By comparison the Georgia version of Rules 3.4(c) and 3.4(e) are
labeled "Reserved," as is section (d).273 Neither the Rules nor the
comments thereto give any explanation for the deletion, which is
especially puzzling in light of the fact that our former Directory Rule 7106274 prohibited all of the above and more. Presumably, that is why
the court referenced the Directory Rule, instead of any current rule, to
disapprove of Hertz's statements that "'[when
I give an oath I put God
275
under there.' 'You can hold me to it."'
But one should not wax too nostalgic over the past rules. Even when
we had an aspirational Directory Rule on point, there was no corresponding Standard of Conduct.276 Thus, even if Hertz had done
exactly the same thing before January 1, 2001,277 the result would

have been no different. It seems as though Georgia competes, if it does
not lead, in the race to the bottom by not providing even the slightest
official disapprobation of this conduct. This is surprising in light of the
fact that the Georgia Supreme Court was one of the first in the nation

to establish its own Commission on Professionalism. 278 Also, it is

inconsistent with the court's recognition that "the way in which our
clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society

273. ABA Model Rule 3.4(d) states that a lawyer shall not "in pretrial procedure, make
a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party ....
" MODEL RULES OF PROF
CONDUCT R. 3.4(d), supra note 31, at 347.
274. Directory Rule 7-106(C) provided that a lawyer shall not
state or allude to any matter that... will not be supported by admissible evidence
... assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as
a witness ... assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant ... fail to comply
with known local customs of courtesy or practice ... engage in undignified or
discourteous conduct ...intentionally or habitually violate any established rule
of procedure or of evidence.
Directory Rule 7-106(c), supra note 35, at H-37.
275. Sangster, 264 Ga. App. at 215 n.3, 590 S.E.2d at 204 n.3.
276. See Part IV: Discipline, Rule 4-101, which made only the Standards of Conduct
enforceable in bar disciplinary proceedings. DISCIPLINE RuLE 4-101, supra note 35, at H40.
277. The current Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in June 2000,
and went into effect January 1, 2001. See supra note 77, at http'J/www.gabar.org/ogcrules.
asp.
278. A historical background of the Commission may be found at http://www.gabar.org/
cjcphistory.asp.
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and we should act accordingly."2 9 Maybe it is time we reconsider our
position on the "Reserved" portions of the Rules.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Neither the supreme court nor the court of appeals rendered any
earth-shaking opinions this past year in the legal ethics area. However,
the supreme court's advisory opinion on real estate closings guarantees
the continuation of a debate over how much control the courts and
lawyers have over services related to the practice of law. Enterprising
nonlawyers will no doubt continue to devise methods by which they offer
consumer services closely related to those offered by lawyers, sometimes
in conjunction with lawyers, other times completely separate from them.
The legal profession's face changed dramatically with the advent of legal
advertising; its face is likely to undergo more dramatic changes in the
near future. It would also be nice if, in the process of changing with the
times, we can catch up with other jurisdictions and speak our disapproval of actions like those in Sangster.

279. Aspirational Statement of Professionalism,supra note 8, at H-128.

